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LOSS CAUSATION, ECONOMIC LOSS RULES AND OFFSET 
DEFENSES—DISMISSAL MOTION PRACTICE AFTER 
ACTICON A.G. V. CHINA NORTH EAST PETROLEUM 
HOLDINGS LTD. 
Laurence A. Steckman* 
Robert E. Conner** 
Kris Steckman Taylor*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Acticon A.G. v. China North East Petroleum Holdings Lim-
 
* Laurence A. Steckman is a partner in the law firm Eaton & Van Winkle LLP in New York 
City and has been a member of the Board of Advisors of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 and Reporter since 1996.  In July, 2006, Super Lawyers Magazine, in its 
premiere New York edition, identified Mr. Steckman as one of New York's “Super Lawyers” 
in securities and business litigation.  He received this honor once again in 2013.  Mr. Steck-
man received his Masters degree in philosophy from Columbia University where he was a 
doctoral candidate prior to receiving his law degree, with honors, from Touro Law School.  
He has practiced law for more than twenty-five years and has written extensively on legal 
and economic causation and damages theory.  He is the author or lead co-author of more 
than forty published works on the law. 
** Robert E. Conner is a founding member of Thornapple Associates, Inc., which is now in 
its 31st year of providing expert consulting services and testimony in investment and com-
mercial disputes.  Mr. Conner has provided expert services in more than 800 disputes.  He is 
a graduate of Harvard Business School and Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, with Ph.D. studies at Harvard and M.I.T. in economics, statistics and government.  He 
has authored or co-authored twenty-six investment and law articles related to securities dis-
putes.  Thornapple has provided services to the S.E.C., I.R.S., State Attorneys General and 
Banking and Securities Commissioners.  He has taught graduate level statistics and finance. 
*** Kris Steckman Taylor is an attorney, an investment banking professional and Counsel to 
Tigress Financial Partners, a New York-based Broker-Dealer and Boutique Investment Bank 
which he helped found and where he is a Registered Principal.  He has published on predic-
tive models and holds FINRA Series 7, 24, 52, 53, 63, 87, and 99 licenses.   Mr. Taylor acts 
as a litigation consultant for Borgers & Associates, with a focus on helping institutional in-
vestors recover for investments in defective RMBS and other asset-backed securities.  Mr. 
Taylor graduated from the Honors Program at the University of Tampa with a BA in Politi-
cal Science, and received his Juris Doctorate from Pepperdine University School of Law, 
where he was an editor of the Business Law Review.  He is a member of the New York State 
Bar.  
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ited,1 the Second Circuit clarified several issues regarding the plead-
ing of loss causation and application of the second investment rule 
defense in Rule 10b-5 class suits.  The precise issue, as framed by the 
Second Circuit, was “whether the fact that a stock’s share price re-
covered soon after the fraud became known defeats an inference of 
economic loss.”2  It ruled that price recovery does not defeat an infer-
ence of economic loss: 
[A] share of stock that has regained its value after a 
period of decline is not functionally equivalent to an 
inflated share that has never lost value. . . .  [I]t is im-
proper to offset gains that the plaintiff recovers after 
the fraud becomes known against losses caused by the 
revelation of the fraud if the stock recovers for com-
pletely unrelated reasons.  Such a holding would place 
the plaintiff in a worse position than he would have 
been absent the fraud.3 
The Second Circuit concluded an offset rule, such as the one it reject-
ed, would deprive an investor of the benefits of a “second investment 
decision” to refrain from selling a security, notwithstanding a correc-
tive disclosure of fraud, and the opportunity to make a determination 
as to whether to continue holding that investment, based on its non-
fraudulent, remaining merits: 
In the absence of fraud, the plaintiff would have pur-
chased the security at an uninflated price and would 
have also benefitted from the unrelated gain in stock 
price.  If we credit an unrelated gain against the plain-
tiff’s recovery for the inflated purchase price, he has 
not been brought to the same position as a plaintiff 
who was not defrauded because he does not have the 
opportunity to profit (or suffer losses) from “a second 
investment decision unrelated to his initial decision to 
purchase the stock.”4 
  The Second Circuit vacated the district court order dismissing 
the complaint, holding: “the fact that the price of the stock recovered 
 
1 692 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2012). 
2 Id. at 35-36. 
3 Id. at 41. 
4 Id. (quoting Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 228 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 1054 (1976)). 
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soon after the price dropped does not negate an inference of econom-
ic loss and loss causation at the pleading stage.”5  While noting that 
the Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo6 had 
considered pleading standards of economic loss and loss causation 
together, the Second Circuit held that the price fluctuations at issue in 
Acticon would not rebut an inference of economic loss, under either 
standard.7  It rejected what it called an “economic loss rule” upon 
which several district courts had relied in dismissing Rule 10b-5 se-
curities cases.8 
In Malin v. XL Capital Ltd.,9 for example, the district court 
held: 
[A] price fluctuation without any realization of an 
economic loss is functionally equivalent to the Su-
preme Court’s rejection of an artificially inflated pur-
chase price alone as economic loss.  If the current val-
ue is commensurate to the purchase price, there is no 
loss, regardless of whether the purchase price was arti-
ficially inflated.  Thus, under the circumstances, Plain-
tiffs’ allegations of an economic loss are insufficient 
when considered in conjunction with the evidence of 
price recovery.10 
Relying on Malin, the district court in Ross v. Walton11 ex-
plained and held: 
Analogous to Malin, Plaintiffs here argue that all they 
need to allege is a facially plausible price drop caused 
by the misrepresentation.  However, the Court is una-
ware of any authority in which actual economic loss 
was found when the stock value returned to pre-
disclosure prices and could have been sold at a profit 
just after the class period.  It appears undisputed that 
on at least three occasions in June 2007 each Plaintiff 
 
5 Id. at 41. 
6 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
7 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 38. 
8 Id. at 40. 
9 No. 3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL 2146089 (D.Conn. Sept. 1, 2005), abrogated by Acti-
con, 692 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2012). 
10 Id. at *4 (emphasis added). 
11 668 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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could have sold the stock at a profit.  The Court agrees 
with Defendants that, while a sale of stock is not nec-
essary, if the stock’s value was commensurate to the 
pre-disclosure trading price after the close of the class 
period [and] could have been sold at a profit, the “ac-
tual economic loss” contemplated in Dura is preclud-
ed.  Further, Dura requires that a plaintiff show that it 
was this revelation that caused the loss and not one of 
the “tangle of factors” that affect price.  Plaintiffs ar-
gument that Section 21D(e) provides a presumption of 
a causal connection is misplaced.  Any conclusion 
otherwise would “automatically supply the causation 
element to all securities plaintiffs,” contravene Dura 
which mandates a judicial inquiry into the causation 
element.12 
In In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation,13 anoth-
er district judge, citing Malin, held: “[P]laintiffs who chose to retain 
their shares past the point when the . . . shares were purchased, can 
prove no economic loss that is attributable to any of the defendants’ 
alleged misrepresentations.”14 
The Malin court’s concept of “functional equivalence” was 
referenced, but not well explicated, by the Second Circuit in its deci-
sion.15  A clear understanding of why the “economic loss rule” was 
rejected is important in understanding how the Second Circuit cur-
rently views loss causation-based motion practice in Rule 10b-5 class 
suits, when the stock price of affected securities has recovered to pre-
corrective disclosure levels.16  Acticon clarified in important ways the 
Second Circuit’s view on the relationship between the second in-
vestment rule and loss causation in motion practice under the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“Reform Act” or 
 
12 Id. at 42-43. 
13 No. 05-MD-01695 (CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 7630569 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007). 
14 Id. at *7. 
15 See generally Laurence Steckman & Robert Conner, Loss Causation under Rule 10b-5, 
a Circuit-by-Circuit Analysis: When Should Representational Misconduct be Deemed the 
Cause of Legal Injury under the Federal Securities Law?, 1998 SEC. ARBITRATION, Vol. 1, 
Ch. 16, 375 (P.L.I. 1998), reprinted in RICO Law Reporter, Vol. 28, No. 2, at 173 (Aug. 
1998), reprinted in Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Reporter, Vol. 5, No. 6, at 897-
956 (Sept. 1998). 
16 Id. 
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“PSLRA”).17 
II. IN RE CHINA NORTH EAST PETROLEUM HOLDINGS LTD. 
SECURITIES LITIGATION 
A. The District Court’s View of the Case 
In the district court, Acticon was lead plaintiff in consolidated 
class suits against China North East Petroleum Holdings Ltd. 
(“NEP”) claiming NEP misled investors and that the wrongdoing was 
revealed through several NEP corrective disclosures.18  NEP’s stock 
price dropped on the trading days following each such disclosure, but 
rebounded above Acticon’s average purchase price on twelve days 
within the final two calendar months of the 90-day period following 
the final corrective disclosure.19  The defense argued Acticon could 
have sold at several times and recovered all the money it claimed to 
have lost and, because it had failed to do so, under Malin and its 
progeny, plaintiffs lacked recoverable damages for failure to properly 
plead loss causation.20 
District Judge Cedarbaum began her analysis by reasoning 
that since Dura, courts, as a matter of law, have held that a purchaser 
who holds stock to a point where its post-disclosure price has risen 
above the purchase price suffers no economic loss and that this is true 
even if the price fell following a corrective disclosure.21  Judge Ce-
darbaum further stated that Malin had quoted Dura in dismissing a 
complaint brought by securities purchasers who chose not to sell at a 
profit, following a corrective disclosure: 
[T]he stock price had declined in the days following 
the disclosure but, within sixty trading days, had re-
covered to exceed its pre-disclosure closing price.  
That post-disclosure recovery, the court held, preclud-
ed a claim for securities fraud because “a price fluctu-
 
17 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). 
18 See Acticon, 692 F.3d at 36; In re China N. E. Petrol. Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. 
Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated and remanded by Acticon, 692 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
19 See Acticon, 692 F.3d at 36. 
20 Id. at 36-37. 
21 In re China, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 352-53. 
5
Steckman et al.: Loss Causation
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
506 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
ation without any realization of an economic loss is 
functionally equivalent to the Supreme Court’s rejec-
tion of an artificially inflated purchase price alone as 
an economic loss.”22 
The Malin court, however, had actually misquoted the actual wording 
of Dura—specifically, Judge Dorsey wrote: “If the current value is 
commensurate to the purchase price, there is no loss, regardless of 
whether the purchase price was artificially inflated.”23  Dura, howev-
er, had not used the phrase “current value,” but the phrase “at that in-
stant.”24  Hence, the Second Circuit faulted the Malin court, and its 
progeny, for “extrapolat[ing]” from Dura.25 
Acticon argued it should be permitted to recover losses be-
cause it sold its shares at lower prices than had prevailed in earlier 
months.26  Rejecting Acticon’s argument, Judge Cedarbaum ex-
plained and held: 
[A]lthough these sales were unquestionably at a loss, 
that loss cannot be imputed to any of NEP’s alleged 
misrepresentations.  A plaintiff who forgoes a chance 
to sell at a profit following a corrective disclosure 
cannot logically ascribe a later loss to devaluation 
caused by the disclosure.  Thus, Acticon has not suf-
fered any loss attributable to the misrepresentations al-
leged in the complaint.  Because the absence of eco-
nomic loss is sufficient grounds for dismissal, I do not 
reach the other arguments offered by defendants . . . .27 
Because Acticon could have sold its holdings at a profit within 90 
days after NEP’s final corrective disclosure made the misrepresenta-
tions at issue public, the district court, referring to “missed opportuni-
ties,” held Acticon’s losses could not be “imputed to any of NEP’s 
alleged misrepresentations.”28  Judge Cedarbaum misconstrued Acti-
con’s decision not to sell at a profit when it could have done so as the 
direct cause of its losses; in other words, that decision, rather than the 
 
22 Id. at 352-53 (quoting Malin, 2005 WL 2146089, at *4). 
23 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 41 (citing Malin, 2005 WL 2146089, at *4) (emphasis added). 
24 Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. 
25 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 40. 
26 Id. at 40-41. 
27 In re China, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 353. 
28 Id. 
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corrective disclosure of defendants’ fraudulent misrepresentations, 
was the actual proximate cause of plaintiffs’ losses: “[a] plaintiff who 
forgoes a chance to sell at a profit following a corrective disclosure 
cannot logically ascribe a later loss to devaluation caused by the dis-
closure.”29 
In Judge Cedarbaum’s view, because Acticon, knowing its in-
itial purchase was at an inflated price as the result of fraud and that 
the post-disclosure value of NEP shares could increase or decrease, 
could have eliminated all its damages by selling at a profit, but in-
stead decided to retain its shares, which was the legal cause of injury.  
Judge Cedarbaum’s holding reflects the view that an injured party 
must mitigate its damages when it has the means to reasonably do 
so.30  The second investment rule, moreover, bars claims for damage 
when losses have resulted from a plaintiff’s voluntarily decision to 
undertake the investment risks associated with holding a security 
whose pricing has historically been or is currently affected by fraud 
on a going-forward basis.31 
However, Judge Cedarbaum’s reasoning in Acticon conflated 
two distinct events of separate causal origin, thereby implicitly and 
inappropriately netting the economic outcomes of the two unrelated 
events as if they were one.  In consequence, Judge Cedarbaum erred 
in imposing an offsetting measure of damages that failed to recognize 
the validity of Acticon’s loss causation argument and associated 
measure of damages arising from the corrective disclosure of an al-
leged fraud.  As a matter of loss causation, losses incurred as the re-
sult of a purchase or hold decision subsequent to a final corrective 
disclosure are not damages attributable to the preceding securities 
fraud, since the investor made a new “second” investment decision to 
expose itself to post-disclosure investment risks, a decision causally 
independent and uncorrelated with defendants’ misrepresentations 
and/or omissions of material fact. 
B. The PSLRA “Bounce Back” 
The PSLRA “bounce back” is not a theory of damages but a 
 
29 Id. 
30 See Laurence Steckman, Robert Conner, Courtney Bellaire & Steven Getzoff, Mitiga-
tion of Damages in Securities Litigation and Securities Arbitration, 2004 SEC. ARBITRATION, 
ch. 19, at 585, 589-97 (P.L.I. 2004) (discussing cases considering when circumstances for 
mitigation are “reasonable,” and synthesizing results). 
31 See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text. 
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rule designed to reasonably “cap” recoverable damages arising from 
the continued ownership of stock purchased prior to corrective dis-
closure(s).32  The “bounce back” provision caps damages as follows: 
[T]he award of damages to the plaintiff shall not ex-
ceed the difference between the purchase or sale price 
paid . . . by the plaintiff for the subject security and the 
mean trading price of that security during the 90-day 
period beginning on the date on which the information 
correcting the misstatement or omission that is the ba-
sis for the action is disseminated to the market.33 
“Mean trading price” is  defined as “an average of the daily trading 
price of that security, determined as of the close of the market each 
day during the 90-day period.”34  The court in Acticon stated: 
[I]f the “mean trading price of a security during the 
90-day period following the correction is greater than 
the price at which the plaintiff purchased his stock 
then that plaintiff would recover nothing under the 
PSLRA’s limitation on damages.”  But if the mean 
trading price during the 90-day period is less than 
plaintiff’s purchase price, plaintiff may recover out-of-
pocket damages up to the difference between her pur-
chase price and the mean trading price.35 
The Reform Act’s legislative history indicates Congress lim-
ited damages because it believed that “[c]alculating damages based 
on the date corrective information is disclosed may substantially 
overestimate plaintiff’s actual damages.”36  The provision is intended 
to limit damages to “those losses caused by the fraud and not by other 
market conditions.”37 
Aside from imposing the “bounce back” cap on damages, the 
Second Circuit observed that Congress did not otherwise disturb the 
 
32 See Acticon, 692 F.3d at 38-39. 
33 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (2010). 
34 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(3) (2010). 
35 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 39 (quoting In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 461 
(9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis omitted)). 
36 Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 20 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 
699). 
37 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 39. 
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traditional out-of-pocket method.38  Rather than being forced to “sell 
to sue,” the Reform Act preserves investor freedom to make a “sec-
ond investment decision” to hold such stock.39  Critically, that deci-
sion will not influence an investor’s ability to recover fraud-caused 
damages, albeit capped at the average daily closing price of the stock 
at issue over a 90-day period following the last corrective disclo-
sure.40 
The premise underlying the Reform Act “bounce back” is that 
an efficient market will, over time, adjust the price of a security so it 
reflects the disclosure of a fraud in the market.  This provides an ob-
jective basis for calculating damage equal to the difference between 
the average post-disclosure price and the last closing price just prior 
to corrective disclosure.  Rather than being required to sell at a mo-
ment of heightened uncertainty as to the magnitude of the impact of 
the disclosed fraud on the market price of the security, investors can, 
instead, rely on the efficiency and transparency of the market to sort 
it out, an objective basis for limiting the post-disclosure measure of 
economic loss attributable to the fraud. 
By contrast, Judge Cedarbaum held that Acticon suffered “no 
actionable loss” with respect to its continued holding of NEP stock 
and, in fact, could have turned a profit had Acticon sold its NEP 
stock position months after the final corrective disclosure–thereby 
finding the complaint failed to properly plead loss causation.41  She 
did not mention any particular damage theory, including the out-of-
pocket theory or second investment rule to which the Second Circuit 
would refer, nor to the Reform Act bounce back provision. 
C. The Second Circuit on the Error of Malin 
The Second Circuit held that the district court, in granting 
dismissal, erred and explained at length where its analysis went 
astray.42  Namely, in its reliance on a rule set forth in Malin and sub-
 
38 Id. 
39 See In re Veeco, 2007 WL 7630569, at *7. 
40 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 38-39. 
41 Id. at 37.  The relevant period for the putative class action began May 15, 2008, with 
corrective disclosures beginning on February 23, 2010; NYSE trading of NEP stock was 
halted as of May 25, 2010 and did not resume trading until September 9, 2010 (marked by a 
20% price drop since close of trading in May), from which date the 90-day post-disclosure 
trading period was measured. 
42 Id. at 39-41 
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sequently relied upon by several other district courts in reliance: 
The limitation upon damages imposed by the District 
Court—and by the other district court decisions upon 
which it relied—is inconsistent with both the tradi-
tional out-of-pocket measure for damages and the 
“bounce back” cap imposed in the PSLRA.  This line 
of cases, beginning with Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., 
holds that [in the instance of] a securities fraud plain-
tiff suffers no economic loss if the price of the stock 
rebounds to the plaintiff’s purchase price at some 
point after the final alleged corrective disclosure.  The 
Malin court correctly noted that the fact that the price 
rebounded does not, at the pleading stage, negate the 
plaintiff’s showing of loss causation.  The Malin court 
reasoned that determining why a stock’s price re-
bounded after an initial drop requires the court to con-
sider “a competing theory of causation and raises fac-
tual questions not suitable for resolution on a motion 
to dismiss.”  We agree with the Malin court’s analysis 
on this point.43 
The Acticon defendants argued that the share price rebound, 
in and of itself, evidenced the market was unfazed by the alleged cor-
rective disclosures and, therefore, the disclosures must be unrelated 
to Acticon’s losses.44  However, rejecting that argument, the Second 
Circuit held that, at the dismissal phase of litigation, the district court 
should not have attempted to resolve why NEP’s share price rebound-
ed after its initial fall.45  Rather, it should have drawn all reasonable 
inferences in favor of Acticon, the non-moving party, and assumed 
the price rose for reasons unrelated to its initial drop.46  Per the Sec-
ond Circuit, that is also where Malin got it wrong: 
The Malin court held, however, that a rebound in 
stock price three months after the close of a class peri-
od negates an inference of economic loss.  In reaching 
this holding, Malin and the courts following it have 
extrapolated from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
 
43 Id. (quoting Malin, 2005 WL 2146089, at *4). 
44 In re China, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 353. 
45 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 41. 
46 Id. 
10
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Dura.  In Dura, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding that securities fraud plaintiffs need only 
demonstrate “that the price on the date of purchase 
was inflated because of the misrepresentation.”  Ac-
cording to the Court, “this statement of the law is 
wrong” because ordinarily in fraud-on-the-market cas-
es “an inflated purchase price will not itself constitute 
or proximately cause the relevant economic loss.”  As 
the Court explained, “[A]s a matter of pure logic, at 
the moment the transaction takes place, the plaintiff 
has suffered no loss; the inflated purchase payment is 
offset by ownership of a share that at that instant pos-
sesses equivalent value.”  Moreover, the “logical link 
between the inflated share purchase price and any later 
economic loss is not invariably strong.”47 
The court in Acticon continued: 
For example, a purchaser might “sell[ ] the shares 
quickly before the relevant truth begins to leak out,” 
with the result that “the misrepresentation will not 
have led to any loss.”  Further, even if a purchaser 
sells at a lower price after a corrective disclosure is 
made, “that lower price may reflect, not the earlier 
misrepresentation, but changed economic circum-
stances, changed investor expectations, new industry-
specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other 
events, which taken separately or together account for 
some or all of that lower price.”  Accordingly, the 
Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which 
“would allow recovery where a misrepresentation 
leads to an inflated purchase price but nonetheless 
does not proximately cause any economic loss.”48 
Dura, the Second Circuit explained, did not alter the tradi-
tional out-of-pocket measure of securities damages, but clarified that 
under Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs who buy stock at inflated prices must 
still prove economic loss proximately caused by defendant’s misrep-
 
47 Id. at 40 (quoting Dura, 544 U.S. at 342) (internal citations omitted). 
48 Id. (quoting Dura, 544 U.S. at 342-43, 346) (internal citation omitted). 
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resentation(s).49  Acticon, per the Second Circuit, satisfied Dura’s 
pleading requirement because plaintiffs not only alleged they bought 
NEP at an inflated price, but that NEP’s stock price dropped after the 
fraud became known.50  Malin, in contrast, according to the Second 
Circuit’s analysis, adopted a “more expansive view” of Dura.51  It 
placed undue emphasis on the Court’s observation that: “at the mo-
ment the transaction takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the 
inflated purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at 
that instant possesses equivalent value.”52  The Second Circuit then 
identified the precise language in Malin that was in error as follows: 
[A] price fluctuation without any realization of an 
economic loss is functionally equivalent to the Su-
preme Court’s rejection of an artificially inflated pur-
chase price alone as economic loss.  If the current val-
ue is commensurate to the purchase price, there is no 
loss, regardless of whether the purchase price was arti-
ficially inflated.  Thus, under the circumstances, Plain-
tiffs’ allegations of an economic loss are insufficient 
when considered in conjunction with the evidence of 
price recovery.53 
Malin acknowledged that a price rebound does not, at the pleading 
stage, negate the plaintiff’s showing of economic loss.54  Judge 
Dorsey, however, substituted the phrase “current value” for the Su-
preme Court’s phrase “at that instant,” moving the relevant time for-
ward more than 90 days to a post-disclosure market environment.55  
In that environment, the disclosed fraud would be “priced into the 
stock” by the market. 
The problem that the Second Circuit identified was that Judge 
Dorsey had conflated two events—a price decline and a later price 
rebound—and in so doing, effectively netted the economic results of 
two events of completely separate causal origin, comparable, in ef-
 
49 Id. 
50 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 40. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 40-41 (quoting Dura, 544 U.S. at 342). 
53 Id. at 41 (quoting Malin, 2005 WL 2146089, at *4). 
54 Id. at 39. 
55 Cf. Malin, 2005 WL 2146089, at *4 (“If the current value is commensurate to the pur-
chase prices, there is no loss, regardless of whether the purchase price was artificially inflat-
ed”) and Dura, 544 U.S. at 336. 
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fect, to an “offset defense.”56  A subsequent price recovery would, 
under such defense, always prove a prior price decline to have been 
temporary and, by virtue of a rebound, no loss could be causally at-
tributed.57 
D. The Second Circuit’s “Functional Equivalence” 
Argument 
The Second Circuit held that the district court’s analysis was 
“inconsistent with the traditional out-of-pocket measure which calcu-
lates economic loss based on the value of the security at the time the 
fraud becomes known,” as capped by the Reform Acts’ bounce-back 
provision, based on the mean-price, over the look-back period.58  The 
Second Circuit explained: 
[A] share of stock that has regained its value after a 
period of decline is not functionally equivalent to an 
inflated share that has never lost value.  This analysis 
takes two snapshots of the plaintiff’s economic situa-
tion and equates them without taking into account any-
thing that happened in between; it assumes that if 
there are any intervening losses, they can be offset by 
intervening gains.  But it is improper to offset gains 
that the plaintiff recovers after the fraud becomes 
known against losses caused by the revelation of the 
fraud if the stock recovers value for completely unre-
lated reasons.59 
The Second Circuit’s use of the term “value” focuses on Plaintiff’s 
ability to demonstrate economic loss without selling the affected se-
curity and, also, on the market value of the security preceding correc-
tive disclosure.60  That “value” serves as a benchmark of economic 
loss sustained due to a subsequent market price decline.  The Second 
Circuit stated it was unaware of any Supreme or Circuit Court deci-
sion imposing what it referred to as Malin’s “economic-loss rule” and 
found that the PSLRA, while imposing the 90-day bounce back cap 
 
56 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 41. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. (emphasis added). 
60 Id. 
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on damages, did not impose the damage limitation rule Malin ap-
plied.61  The Second Circuit further explained that at the dismissal 
motion phase of litigation, showing a price recovery does not, in it-
self, “negate the inference” of economic loss for loss causation pur-
poses.62  The court stated: 
[A]t this stage in the litigation, we do not know 
whether the price rebounds represent the market’s re-
actions to the disclosure of the alleged fraud or wheth-
er they represent unrelated gains.  We thus do not 
know whether it is proper to offset the price recovery 
against Acticon’s losses in determining Acticon’s eco-
nomic loss.  Accordingly, the recovery does not negate 
the inference that Acticon has suffered an economic 
loss.  Accordingly, it would not be appropriate for a 
district court to consider whether a price rebound rep-
resented the market’s reaction to the disclosure of al-
leged fraud, or, as it might turn out, unrelated gains, 
which should not offset fraud-caused losses.63 
III. DISMISSAL MOTION PRACTICE—LOSS CAUSATION AND THE 
SECOND INVESTMENT RULE AFTER ACTICON 
The Second Circuit referred to the rule upon which the Acti-
con trial court relied as an “economic loss rule,” which held that if 
the price of a fraud-impacted security recovered subsequent to the 
corrective disclosure of a fraud to the extent that plaintiff would then 
be in a position to recover funds expended in buying the securities, he 
or she must act to recover out-of-pocket losses or minimize damag-
es.64  However, if the investor fails to do so, a Rule 10b-5 claim seek-
 
61 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 41. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  See generally Laurence A. Steckman & Robert E. Conner, Litigating Offset Argu-
ments in Compensatory Damage Litigation and Lead Plaintiff Motion Practice in Class Cas-
es: Are Apparently Inconsistent Outcomes Reconcilable?, 3 J. SEC. L. REG. & COMP. 150 
(No. 2, Apr., 2010) (discussing case law on offset defenses in securities litigation and arbi-
tration). 
64 The phrase “economic loss rule” is frequently, although not exclusively, associated with 
tort/negligence cases.  See, e.g., Hydro Investors, Inc. v. Trafalgar Power Inc., 227 F.3d 8, 
16-17 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[economic loss rule] is not always applied in negligence cases.  Pri-
marily, its continuing role is based on the recognition that “[r]elying solely on foreseeability 
to define the extent of liability [in cases involving economic loss], while generally effective, 
14
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ing damages was, prior to the Second Circuit decision in Acticon, 
subject to Rule 12 dismissal for failure to properly plead recoverable 
damages.65  The Second Circuit’s rejection of the Economic Loss 
Rule that the district court had applied in Acticon reflects a clarifica-
tion of doctrines central to modern securities litigation, i.e., loss cau-
sation and the second investment rule, which, on policy grounds, 
place policy-based limits on plaintiff’s recoverable damages. 
A. Dismissal Motion Practice and the Loss Causation 
Doctrine 
Under current law, securities plaintiffs are required to plead 
claims, which, prior to discovery, are both plausible and compel-
ling.66  This means the fraudulent explanation plaintiff proffers for 
challenged conduct in its initial pleading must be at least as likely as 
the non-fraudulent explanation defendant may proffer, in its Rule 12 
motion, if dismissal is to be avoided.67  If plaintiff’s explanation satis-
fies this test, the pleading will survive and discovery, stayed automat-
ically under the Reform Act upon defendant’s Rule 12 filing,68 will 
 
could result in some instances in liability so great that, as a matter of policy, courts would be 
reluctant to impose it.” . . .  To prevent such open-ended liability, courts have applied the 
economic loss rule to prevent the recovery of damages that are inappropriate because they 
actually lie in the nature of breach of contract as opposed to tort, quoting 5th Ave. Choco-
latiere, Ltd. v. 540 Acquisition Co., L.L.C., 712 N.Y.S.2d 8, 12 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2000); 
532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 711 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393-94 
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2000) (“[P]ure economic losses (without property damage or personal 
injury) are not recoverable in a negligence action, and . . . a claimant suffering purely finan-
cial losses is restricted to an action in contract for the benefit of its bargain.”). 
65 See In re China, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 353 (quoting Malin, 2005 WL 2146089, at *4; cit-
ing Ross, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 43; and In re Veeco, 2007 WL 7630569, at *7). 
66 See Sinay v. CNOOC Ltd., 554 F. App’x 40, 42 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[I]nference of scienter 
must be such that ‘a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at 
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw.’ ”) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007)). 
67 See Livingston v. Cablevision Systems Corp., No. 12-CV-377, 2013 WL 4763430, at 
*10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2013) (plaintiff alleging fraud in a § 10(b) action must plead facts 
rendering an inference of scienter at least as likely as any plausible opposing inference and 
must demonstrate it is more likely than not that the defendant acted with scienter—“An in-
ference of fraudulent intent may be plausible, yet less cogent than other, nonculpable expla-
nations for the defendant's conduct. . . .  [A]n inference of scienter must be more than merely 
plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing infer-
ence of nonfraudulent intent.”) (quoting Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314). 
68 See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 732, 792 (S.D. 
Tex. 2008) (“[T]he PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B), mandates a stay on ‘all discovery 
and other proceedings’ with narrow exceptions until after resolution of motions to dismiss.”). 
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commence. 
Under the Reform Act, securities fraud plaintiffs are required 
to plead “loss causation,”69 which requires that plaintiff plead facts 
plausibly showing defendant proximately, that is, foreseeably and/or 
directly, caused the damages for which recovery is sought.70  When 
plaintiff’s loss results from the materialization of a non-market risk 
that was not (or was not properly) disclosed to the injured party, loss 
causation is shown because the loss is deemed causally traceable (and 
sufficiently direct and/or foreseeable) to disclosure misconduct.71  
The policy behind loss causation is the same as that which underlies 
the concept of tort law proximate causation, namely avoidance of re-
covery of potentially unlimited damage claims that would contravene 
public policy and turn errant defendants into windfall guarantors.72  It 
does so by precluding recovery when injury was neither foreseeable 
nor a direct (causal) result of the challenged conduct.73 
The question is whether the policies underlying the loss cau-
sation doctrine are vindicated or undermined by the Second Circuit’s 
ruling in Acticon. 
Under the Second Circuit’s theory in Acticon, the fact that 
plaintiff loses $10 per share out-of-pocket and can recover 100% of 
its out-of-pocket loss through subsequent re-appreciation of the mar-
ket price of the security does not mean plaintiff lacks recoverable 
damages.  This is because shareholders have a right to benefit from 
the bargain they struck, namely price appreciation, inherent in their 
payment of a purchase price for a security investment, from all ap-
propriate sources.74  In contrast, a theory of damages that implicitly 
or explicitly “nets” or “offsets” gains from exogenous non-fraud-
related events against fraud-caused losses would effectively adopt an 
 
69 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (“[T]he plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the 
act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for which the 
plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”). 
70 See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. 
71 See generally Steckman, Loss Causation under Rule 10b-5, supra note 15, at nn.234-
59. 
72 Id. at nn.3-41. 
73 Id. 
74 See generally Laurence A. Steckman & Robert E. Conner, Computing Damages in Rule 
10b-5 Unsuitability Cases: Litigating “Offset” Defenses, 1994 SEC. ARBITRATION, Ch. 24 at 
377-431 (P.L.I. 1994) (discussing market index adjusted damages as a species of benefit of 
the bargain recovery); Laurence A. Steckman & Robert E. Conner, Index Adjusted Portfolio 
Damages in Securities and Investment Fraud Litigation/Arbitration, 2 J. SEC. L., REG. & 
COMP. 360 (No. 4, Sept., 2009). 
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approach to causation and damages that courts have repeatedly re-
jected.75 
Such netting/offsetting defenses have been rejected on several 
grounds, including the fact that allowing defendants to offset or net 
gains against fraud-caused losses would provide them with an inap-
propriate windfall, to the detriment of the injured party.76  The “func-
tional equivalence” language in Acticon does little to explain why the 
“economic loss rule” was properly rejected.  The real reason is that 
the netting implicit in the district court’s economic loss rule would 
prevent an apples-to-apples comparison as to the reasons for the loss 
being claimed. Losses due to fraud stand on a different footing from 
gains due to non-fraud-related causes and netting/offset defenses 
have been rejected in securities cases.77  Although the district court 
correctly observed that a plaintiff who forgoes a chance to sell at a 
profit following a corrective disclosure cannot logically ascribe a lat-
er loss to devaluation caused by the disclosure, what constitutes 
“profit” cannot be separated from economic and legal conditions that 
generate it.  A rule that permits defendants to benefit from a post-
disclosure stock price increase to offset fraud-caused losses not only 
shields defendants from potential liability for their securities miscon-
duct but might deprive an investor of damages to which equity might 
suggest he or she should be entitled, based on the benefit for which 
he or she had bargained, in the first instance. 
B. Second Investment Rule and Unrelated Gains 
The Second Circuit explained that if it were to offset “unrelat-
ed gains” against plaintiff’s recovery for the inflated purchase price, 
plaintiff would not be brought to the same position as a plaintiff who 
was not defrauded.78  Quoting Harris v. American Investment Co.,79 a 
leading second investment rule case, the Second Circuit explained 
this was because the defrauded plaintiff would lack the “opportunity 
to profit (or suffer losses) from ‘a second investment decision unre-
lated to his initial decision to purchase the stock.’ ”80 
 
75 See generally Steckman, Litigating Offset Arguments in Compensatory Damage Litiga-
tion, supra note 63. 
76 Id. (collecting and discussing cases). 
77 Id. 
78 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 41. 
79 523 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1975). 
80 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 41 (quoting Harris, 523 F.2d at 228). 
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The Harris court explained the rationale for the second in-
vestment rule—if an investor, aware fraud occurred, nonetheless 
chooses to continue to hold the affected security, he or she has made 
a second investment decision “unrelated” to the initial purchase deci-
sion.81  Such a second investment decision, by virtue of being made 
after corrective disclosure of the fraud, would not be affected by the 
fraud.  Any loss incurred as a result of a second investment decision 
will be due to a materialization of (post-fraud) market risk and is not 
the result of the alleged fraudulent conduct of a defendant.82  In a 
market unaffected by fraud, the price at which a security trades is 
thought, under the efficient market hypothesis,
 
to reflect all available 
market information.83  The second investment rule is designed to al-
 
81 Harris, 523 F.2d at 227-28 (where plaintiff purchased shares at a time when, he alleged, 
the filing of false and misleading information had artificially inflated the market price, dis-
trict court found plaintiff suffered no damages because he could have recovered his invest-
ment by selling just after he had made his investment or after filing his lawsuit—the appeal 
court reversed, holding plaintiff could show damages by proving the actual value of securi-
ties on the purchase date was less then what plaintiff paid for them or by comparing the latter 
sum with the market value of the securities after fraud was publicly disclosed).  Accord 
Shapiro v. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co., 626 F.2d 63, 68-69 (8th Cir. 1980) (damages 
for securities fraud are determined in accordance with the extent to which false and mislead-
ing information actually harmed the complaining party, either directly (through actual reli-
ance) or indirectly (by affecting the market upon which the party traded)). 
82 Harris, 523 F.2d 228 (a defrauded buyer can maintain a damages action, even if he con-
tinues to hold securities because, in such a case, the buyer has: “in effect, made a second in-
vestment decision [at the time he discovers the fraud, one] unrelated to his initial decision to 
purchase the stock.”  Damages for fraud in the initial transaction are not affected by events 
after this second decision.); see Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., 
888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 475 n.294 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), quoting In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 244 F. Supp. 2d 247, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The court stated: 
The damages of a purchaser were always understood to be the difference 
between the purchase price and the true value of the shares (adjusted for 
any negative causation) as disclosed after the revelation of the fraud to 
the public, followed by a reasonable period (usually no longer than a 
week or ten days) during which the market took cognizance of the fraud 
and the publicly traded price was presumed, under the ‘efficient market’ 
hypothesis endorsed by the Supreme Court in Basic [Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224 (1988)], to reflect an adjustment for the fraud.  If the plain-
tiff or absent class member retained the security after the period of time 
within which the efficient market adjusted for the revelation of the fraud, 
he or she made a new investment decision, and could not collect damag-
es for any further drop in the market price. 
Id. 
83 The efficient market hypothesis states that stock market efficiency will cause existing 
share prices to always incorporate and reflect all relevant information and, for that reason, 
equities will always trade at fair value on stock exchanges.  The theory is controversial and 
commentators have questioned its use in securities cases.  See, e.g., Laurence A. Steckman, 
18
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low plaintiff to recover only that amount by which he or she was in-
jured due to the price-distorting effects of fraudulent representa-
tion(s),84 preventing windfalls unrelated to defendant’s misconduct.85  
From the perspective of damage mitigation, when plaintiff knows a 
fraud occurred, but fails to act to minimize damages within a reason-
able period of time after learning of it,86  he or she is disabled from 
 
Risk Arbitrage and Insider Trading: A Functional Analysis of the Fiduciary Concept under 
Rule 10b-5, 5 TOURO L. REV. 121, 142-53 (1988) (discussing fraud on the market theory and 
presumption of reliance under then recent authority, Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), 
advocating alternative market impact theory of insider trading liability under functional 
analysis).  In 2013, in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 
1184 (2013), four Supreme Court Justices questioned both the fraud on the market theory 
and the efficient market hypothesis upon which it is based.  Justice Ginsburg noted current 
economic research showing market efficiency is not a “binary, yes or no question,” conclud-
ing that “differences in efficiency can exist within a single market.”  Id. at 1198 n.6.  Justice 
Scalia called Basic “arguably regrettable” authority.  Id. at 1206 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Jus-
tice Thomas called the theory “questionable.”  Id. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Jus-
tice Alito stated that a reconsideration of the Basic reliance presumption might overrule the 
theory entirely.  Id. at 1204 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
84 See Katz v. First of Michigan, No. K87-264 CA4, 1989 WL 62196, at *12-13 (W.D. 
Mich. Mar. 13, 1989) (where plaintiff continues to hold the stock after discovery of the 
fraud, he can be deemed to have made a second investment decision and “his recovery will 
be correspondingly reduced. . . .  [D]amages are limited by what the plaintiffs would have 
realized if they had acted upon their claim when they first learned of the fraud or had reason 
to know of it.”) (citations omitted). 
85 See In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., No. 77 C 1206, 1985 WL 3928, at *8-9 
 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1985) (“The law does not permit an investor to stay and see how things 
work out after discovering the alleged past impropriety which brought him to the decision to 
stay or get out, and then recover damages for events which follow the investor's decision to 
stay,” (citing Harris, 523 F.2d at 228)).  The court explained:  
Although a plaintiff need not sell his stock after discovery of the fraud in 
order to bring his cause of action, he cannot recover for the diminution in 
value of the stock following the discovery because he has, in effect, 
made a second investment decision to purchase the stock.  Plaintiffs who 
are found to have made a second investment decision cannot recover for 
any losses which result from that decision, not because they are equita-
bly estopped from doing so, but because those losses were not caused by 
their initial decision to purchase. 
Id. 
86 Time is “reasonable” when it allows the owner to consult counsel and to employ anoth-
er broker and/or analyze the market.  See generally Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 
588 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1978) (under second investment doctrine, once a reasonable time 
passes, any increase or decrease in stock value cannot be causally tied to the fraud that 
caused the initial purchase decision and later events, for this reason, will not affect damage 
calculations); Cant v. A. G. Becker & Co., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 972, 975 (N.D. Ill. 1974) 
(where defendant argued damages plaintiff suffered based on diminished value of stock 
should be offset by value of shares held after complaint was filed, the “key date as to the 
damage issue” under the second investment rule was the date plaintiff discovered or should 
have discovered he was defrauded.).  The court stated: 
19
Steckman et al.: Loss Causation
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
520 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
recovering damages.87 The idea behind the second investment rule is 
that plaintiff’s “second investment decision” has broken the causal 
link between defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s damage. The 
idea behind damage mitigation rules is that by requiring a plaintiff to 
act to reduce its damages in an instance in which doing so is reasona-
bly achievable, economic efficiencies are preserved for the benefit of 
the economic system, as a whole.  Mitigation is generally raised as an 
affirmative defense in a responsive pleading, is fact intensive and, for 
this reason, not generally the subject of Rule 12 motion practice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
After Acticon, defense counsel may still properly argue, in 
appropriate cases, that plaintiff has failed to plead a sufficient causal 
link between fraudulent conduct and directly or foreseeably caused 
loss and that dismissal of the pleading is required.  However, they 
may not do so by relying sub silentio on an economic loss rule that 
itself relies on an offsetting/netting strategy with built-in factual as-
sumptions that cannot be established under Rule 12 motion rules.  
This is especially appropriate in cases where “netting” or “offsetting” 
contravenes fundamental intuitions of fairness and/or applicable ben-
efit of the bargain principles.88 
 
The plaintiff will not be able to avail himself of any further decrease in 
the value of the security after that date.  So also the defendant should not 
be able to avail itself of any increase in the value of the stock after that 
date.  This is the only method in which a consistent measure of damages 
can be obtained.  If the defendant's contention was accepted the scale of 
damages would be prejudicially tipped in favor of the defendant. 
Id.  
87 See generally Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 470 F. Supp. 509, 516, n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979), rev’d in part on other grounds, 629 F.2d 705 (1980) (plaintiffs' gross economic losses 
must be reduced by the amount plaintiffs lost due to their failure to sell securities within a 
reasonable period after discovering defendant's fraud, noting the Second Circuit “seems to 
regard plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages as a possible ground for reducing the amount of 
the damage award in an appropriate case,” and that such an approach has received support 
from courts and commentators alike because it attempts to calculate the amount of damages 
based upon losses attributable to the fraud, citing, inter alia, Harris, and stating: “if the 
plaintiff continues to hold the stock after the discovery of the fraud, he can be deemed to 
have made a ‘second investment decision,’ based on the ‘total mix’ of information availa-
ble.”). 
88 See generally Laurence A. Steckman & Robert E. Conner, Computing Damages in Rule 
10b-5 Unsuitability Cases: Litigating “Offset” Defenses, in 1994 SEC. ARBITRATION, Ch. 24 
at 377-431 (P.L.I. 1994) (discussing market index adjusted damages as a species of benefit 
of the bargain recovery); see supra note 63. 
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